Abstract: We study both the practical and theoretical eciency of private information retrieval (PIR) protocols in a model wherein several untrusted servers work to obliviously service remote clients' requests for data and yet no pair of servers colludes in a bid to violate said obliviousness. In exchange for such a strong security assumption, we obtain new PIR protocols exhibiting remarkable e ciency with respect to every cost metric-download, upload, computation, and round complexity-typically considered in the PIR literature.
Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR) is a cryptographic primitive enabling clients to fetch records from a remote database without revealing to the database holder(s) which records Syed Mahbub Ha z: Indiana University, E-mail: sha z@indiana.edu *Corresponding Author: Ryan Henry: University of Calgary, E-mail: ryan.henry@ucalgary.ca they fetch. This paper concerns both the practical and theoretical e ciency of so-called "1-private PIR protocols", wherein the database is hosted jointly by several, say > 1, computationally bounded and pairwise non-colluding servers.
In recent work, Shah, Rashmi, and Ramchandran [28] proposed a construction in this model1 with the following remarkable property: to fetch a b-bit record from a database comprising r such records, the client need only download b+1 bits total. In other words, their construction imposes just one bit of download overhead compared with the most e cient conceivable non-private protocol, thereby establishing that the (download) capacity of 1-private multiserver PIR is e ectively perfect. Inspired by Shah et al.'s result, the informationtheory research community has produced a steady succession of papers characterizing the download capacity of multiserver PIR protocols under a variety of constraints-when the number of servers is xed [31] ; when a threshold number of servers can collude [30] ; when a subset of the servers may be non-responsive [32] or Byzantine [3] ; and so on. One can justi ably view Shah et al.'s result and the body of work it inspired as a breakthrough in our understanding of multiserver PIR's theoretical underpinnings and yet, to date, this work has had essentially zero impact on PIR research within the cryptography and applied privacy research communities. Indeed, so aggressively optimizing download cost at the expense of all else imposes rather exorbitant costs for the other metrics of interest-so exorbitant, in fact, that the constructions in each of the aforementioned papers end up falling short of satisfying any reasonable de nition of "non-triviality" for a PIR protocol (see Definition 3 below).
Our contributions
In this paper, we revisit the "one-extra-bit" construction of Shah et al. with an eye toward mathematical rigor and concrete practicality. Speci cally, we present and analyze a novel family of what we call "one-extra-word" protocols, of which the one-extra-bit construction is an extreme special case. Interestingly, the new family also captures as special cases the 2-server perfectly 1-private protocol of Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz, and Sudan [11, §2.1] and the computationally 1-private protocol of Boyle, Gilboa, and Ishai [8, §3.2] . In terms of practicality, the fact that our family captures the latter two protocols is signi cant; indeed, an implicit "folklore" conjecture positing that these protocols are the "most e cient" possible appears to underlie a good deal of existing PIR research [20, 27, 34 ]. Yet our ndings soundly refute this folklore conjecture: These special cases are among the least practical representatives of our family, with essentially all other reasonable parameter settings yielding instances that are signi cantly more practical. Speci cally, the performance improvements we obtain relative to these special cases grows in proportion to the number of pairwise non-colluding servers that participate in each query, up to some in ection point after which further marginal improvements to download and computation costs are dwarfed by rapidly growing upload costs to an unrealistically large number of servers. (Continuing well beyond this in ection point eventually yields the one-extra-bit construction.) The new family sports detailed security and concrete e ciency analyses, which help to elucidate (and improve on) some curious properties of the eciency and privacy (or lack thereof) of the original one-extrabit protocol.
As our main contribution, we exhibit, for any L ≥ 1, a 2
L -server one-extra-word protocol instance that, although falling short of imposing only a single bit of download overhead, nonetheless (i) provides superior privacy guarantees compared to the one-extra-bit construction and (ii) is shockingly e cient (when L > 1) with respect to every cost metric-download, upload, computation, and round complexity-typically considered in the PIR literature. For a database comprising r -many b-bit records, the client in our protocol uploads just 130L( lg r −7) bits and downloads just b/(2 L − 1) bits of data per server, while each server performs L r /64 AES-128 evaluations and an expected rb/(2 L − 1) bit operations (at the 128-bit security level). These download and computation costs sharply match known lower bounds, suggesting that our protocols are among the most e cient possible. We also extend this protocol to arbitrarily many (non-powerof-2) servers, at the cost of increasing the upload cost and AES-128 evaluation count each by a (small) factor polynomial in the security parameter. This all compares very favorably with prior work; in fact, based on our analysis and empirical performance measurements from our prototype implementation, we hazard to claim that, all told, ours is the most practical multiserver PIR protocol proposed and implemented to date-by a signi cant margin.
In short: Our main contribution is to transform Shah et al.'s one-extra-bit construction from a (highly impractical) theoretical result into what we believe to be the most e cient PIR protocol currently in existence, albeit under the same very strong trust assumption employed by the original.
Outline: Section 2 gives formal de nitions for private information retrieval. Section 3 presents the one-extra-word family of protocols (deferring its "one-extra-bit" instantiation to Appendix B and a detailed security analysis for the family as a whole to Appendix C). Section 4 introduces the bitmore-than-a-bit construction, a subfamily of one-extra-word protocols that improves on one-extra-bit in several respects. Section 5 describes an e cient, computationally 1-private bitmore-than-a-bit construction, rst for 2 L servers ( §5.2) and then for arbitrarily many servers ( §5.3). Section 6 presents ndings from our prototype implementation, including headto-head comparisons with the "folklore" protocols of Chor et al. and Boyle et al. in addition to a selection of multiserver protocols from the open-source Percy ++ ( §6.4) and RAID-PIR ( §6.5) libraries. Section 7 wraps up with some concluding remarks and directions for future work. Appendix A brie y discusses of our results in the context of related work.
Private information retrieval
Let F be a nite eld and let D ∈ F r ×s be a database consisting of r many s-element records (called blocks), each of which is indexed by a positive integer less than or equal to r . Intuitively, PIR is a cryptographic technique that allows a client to fetch one or more blocks of its choosing from D without disclosing to the remote server (or servers) holding D any information about which blocks it fetches. We formalize this intuitive notion of privacy using an indistinguishability-based de nition, as described below.
from that of Q. This requirement leads to a notion that we refer to as "impossibly perfect" privacy, so called because Chor et al. observed in their seminal paper [11, §5.1] that this level of privacy is impossible for any "reasonable" PIR construction to provide. ( We elaborate on what we mean by "reasonable" shortly.) It is nevertheless instructive to state a formal de nition for impossibly perfect privacy-no matter how unsatisable-as it will serve as a useful starting point for our actual, satis able privacy de nition (Definition 4) below.
De nition 1. The interaction described by (I , Q, R, E) provides impossibly perfect privacy if, for all block indices i, i * ∈ [1.
.r ]
and for all query strings q ∈ {0,1} * , we have
where the probability is over all the random coin tosses made by the client.
Definition 1 insists that the conditional distribution of Q given I = i be identical in its entirety to that of Q given I = i * (as opposed to merely insisting that these distributions be ε-close or polynomial-time indistinguishable, or insisting that certain substrings of Q be identically distributed); that is, it insists that the client's query string q contains "no information"-in a strict, information-theoretic sense-about which block the client is using that query string to fetch. This suggests two natural relaxations that might lead to "possible" notions of privacy: (i) insist that the above distributions be merely computationally indistinguishable or (ii) restrict the attacker to observing only part of any given sample from Q. In fact, the privacy de nition we ultimately use-called computational 1-privacy -adopts both relaxations. Before stating that de nition, we de ne two additional requirements (correctness and non-triviality) for a PIR protocol, which collectively describe what we meant above when we spoke of "reasonable" PIR protocols with respect to which Definition 1 is impossible to satisfy.
Correctness:
One trivial way to satisfy Definition 1 is to have the client choose q ∈ {0,1} * arbitrarily and without regard for i. Upon receiving q from the client, the server(s) likewise responds with arbitrary z ∈ {0,1} * , unrelated to q or D.
This interaction clearly o ers perfect privacy, but it is not terribly useful: the response z provides nothing to help the client correctly extract its desired block. The following correctness criterion disquali es such "useless" protocols, requiring that the client actually learns its desired block.
De nition 2. The interaction described by (I , Q, R, E) provides (perfect) correctness if
Notice that the distribution of E is dependent not only on those of I and Q but also on that of R; thus, correctness is necessarily contingent on the faithful execution of the protocol by the server(s).
Non-triviality:
Another trivial way to satisfy Definition 1, while simultaneously satisfying Definition 2, is to again have the client choose q ∈ {0,1} * arbitrarily and without regard for i, but then to have the server(s) respond with the entire database; that is, with z = D. Upon receiving D, the client would then extract the block D ⃗ i from D on her local machine, thus ensuring perfect privacy in exchange for considerable download overhead. The following non-triviality criterion disquali es such "trivially correct" protocols by insisting that the (bidirectional) communication cost of the interaction be asymptotically smaller than the size of D.
De nition 3. The interaction described by (I , Q, R, E) provides non-trivial communication if
that is, if the expected (combined) bitlength of the query and response strings scale sublinearly with the bitlength |D| of D.2
We remark that the various capacity-achieving PIR constructions described in the body of work [3, 28, [30] [31] [32] cited in Section 1 satisfy a weaker de nition of non-triviality wherein only download (i.e., |Q|) is required to scale sublinearly with |D|. In fact, in several of those constructions-e.g., the capacity-achieving constructions of Sun and Jafar [30] [31] [32] the upload cost |R| scales (super-)exponentially in |D|.
Computational and perfect C-privacy: The con uence of De nitions 2 and 3 rules out the "useless" and "trivial" PIR candidates we have considered thus far; indeed, as noted previously, Chor et al. proved in their seminal paper on PIR that it would be impossible to construct any protocol-no matter how clever-that satis es De nitions 1-3 simultaneously. Nevertheless, in the very same paper, they proposed a (simultaneously correct and non-trivial) protocol involving several (say, > 1) non-colluding but otherwise untrusted servers that does perfectly hide the client's request from each of the servers in isolation. In such a multiserver interaction, the query and response are both -tuples, say q = (q 1 , . . . , q ) and z = (z 1 , . . . , z ), from which the client sends q j ∈ {0,1} * to and receives z j ∈ {0,1} * from the j th server.
It is clear that a grand coalition comprising all servers in such a multiserver interaction wields privacy-infringing powers tantamount to those of the lone server in a single-server interaction, in which case Chor et al.'s impossibility result applies.3 Consequently, no multiserver protocol can hope to provide perfect privacy unless certain coalitions among the servers do not form. In order to capture this limitation, it is necessary to both extend and relax Definition 1. Let C ⊆ [1. . ] be an arbitrary coalition among the servers and let Q C denote the random variable that describes the subsequence of query strings (q j ) j ∈C that the client sends to the servers in C.
De nition 4. The interaction described by (I , Q, R, E) provides perfect privacy with respect to C (or perfect C-privacy) if, for all block indices i, i * ∈ [1.
.r ],
Notice that the conditional probabilities on Q C depend only on the distributions of I and Q: Definition 4 permits no restrictions on the computational abilities of nor strategies employed by the servers in C -it merely assumes that they learn nothing of the q j for j ∈ [1. . ] \ C. Many of the PIR constructions considered herein are provably private in the sense of Definition 4; however, proving that our most ecient construction (see Section 5) is private requires-in addition to a non-collusion assumption-a computational assumption (namely, the existence of xed-expansion pseudorandom generators). Such a "computational" notion of privacy for multiserver PIR protocols was rst considered by Chor and Gilboa [9] shortly after the introduction of perfectly private PIR.
De nition 5. The interaction described by (I , Q, R, E) provides computational privacy with respect to C (or computational C-privacy) if, for all block indices i, i * ∈ [1. .r ], the distribution ensembles {Q C |︁ |︁ I = i} λ ∈N and {Q C |︁ |︁ I = i * } λ ∈N are computationally indistinguishable (with security parameter λ).
We stress that the hardness of distinguishing distribution ensembles depends not on D but on some underlying security parameter (the size of which will invariably impact the computationally burden on the client and honest servers). Looking ahead, the security parameter in our computationally 1-private bit-more-than-a-bit constructions will dictate the seed-length for some xed-expansion pseudorandom generator (which we concretely realize using AES).
3 Indeed, given an -server protocol that maintains privacy against such a grand coalition, one could easily construct a single-server protocol in which the lone server takes on the roles of all servers. The resulting protocol would clearly contradict Chor et al.'s impossibility result.
An interaction that satis es either De nition 4 or 5 with respect to all coalitions in the family of subsets Γ = C ⊆ [1. . ] |︁ |︁ |C| ≤ t for some positive-integer threshold t < is colloquially said to be (perfectly or computationally) t-private. Given De nitions 2-5, we can now provide a formal de nition for 1-private PIR protocols.
De nition 6. The interaction described by (I, Q, R, E) is a (perfectly or computationally) 1-private information retrieval protocol if it provides (i) (perfect) correctness, (ii) non-trivial communication, and (iii) (perfect or computational) 1-privacy (in the senses of De nitions 2-5, respectively).
3 "One-extra-word" protocols
We now present our generalization of the "one-extra-bit" construction over an arbitrary nite eld F; we refer to this generalization as the "one-extra-word" family of PIR protocols.
Members of the one-extra-word family are parametrized by (i) the underlying eld F, (ii) the number s of F elements needed to represent each block, (iii) the number of participating servers > 1, and (iv) a vector ν ⃗ ∈ F s and mapping φ to be described below. We call such a tuple of parameters (F, s, , φ, ν ⃗) a one-extra-word instance. (To recover one-extrabit as a one-extra-word instance, we simply set F = GF(2) and = s + 1, and then instantiate the ν ⃗ and φ in a particular way-more on this in Appendix B.) Notation and preliminaries: Recall that the database D is an r ×s matrix over a nite eld F, in which each of the r rows is an s-word block of fetchable data. For each j ∈ [1. .s + 1], let e ⃗ j denote the j th standard basis vector of F s+1 . (We also overload e ⃗ 1 , . . . , e ⃗ s to denote the standard basis vectors in F s ; the dimension of the vector space in which a given e ⃗ j resides will always be clear from context.)
Denote by M (r,s) ⊆ F r ×(s+1) the set of all height-r matrices whose rows are vectors from the standard basis e ⃗ 1 , . . . , e ⃗ s+1 , and consider the family (indexed by i ∈ [1.
.r ]) of equivalence relations ≡ i de ned on the A, B ∈ M (r,s) as (a scalar from F) in the bucket indexed by φ(A). In the simplest possible instantiations, φ is a bijection so that each of the (s + 1) r resulting scalars constitutes the sole contents of its own bucket (thus necessitating = (s + 1) r non-colluding servers). In the sequel, we discuss more e cient instantiations of φ (including the one employed by one-extra-bit), which allow the scheme to use signi cantly fewer servers.
Fetching a block:
Recall that the database D comprises r blocks and that we de ned r equivalence relations ≡ i over M (r,s) . A query for D ⃗ i , the block at index i within D, corresponds to a random equivalence class of M (r,s) under ≡ i .
Speci cally, the client fetches D ⃗ i by rst selecting a uniform random matrix A ∈ R M (r,s) , and then retrieving D * , B j F from bucket φ(B j ) for each B j ∈ Eq(i; A). Because ≡ i is symmetric (so that B ∈ Eq(i; A) i A ∈ Eq(i; B )), for any given index i, there exist precisely (s + 1) r / (s + 1) = (s + 1) r −1 distinct queries with which the client can request D ⃗ i . The next observation is a direct consequence of the remarks following Observation 1. 
.s] form a system of s linear equations in s unknowns. Moreover, D ⃗ i = x 1 , . . . , x s is in the solution set of this system.
Note that Observation 2 implies that the client can compute D ⃗ i given ν ⃗ and the sequence of Frobenius products D * , B 1 F , . . . , D * , B s+1 F whenever the system of linear equations
has full rank and, therefore, a unique solution.
Theorem 1.
A one-extra-word instance provides (perfect) correctness (in the sense of Definition 2) provided ν ⃗ 1 ≠ 1.5
0, which (due to the linear independence of e ⃗ 1 , . . . , e ⃗ s ) can only happen when
We note that the choice ν ⃗ = ⃗ 0 yields an especially convenient (i.e., "already solved") system of equations in which the matrix on the left-hand side of Equation (2.1) is just the identity matrix in F s×s so that D * , B j F − D * , B s+1 F is equal to the j th word of D ⃗ i for each j ∈ [1. .s]. We consider arbitrary ν ⃗ not because it is ever bene cial to use a ν ⃗ ≠ ⃗ 0-indeed, it seems always best to set ν ⃗ = ⃗ 0-but to ensure that the one-extra-bit construction remains a special case of our own.
Communication cost analysis: By inspection, the download cost aggregated across all servers (i.e., |R|) is s + 1 eld elements-one element from each of s+1 many buckets. When F = GF(2), this yields a download cost of just b +1 bits to fetch a b-bit block, which is the lowest possible download cost for any PIR protocol [28, Theorem 1] .
For each j ∈ [1. .s + 1], the client must specify to the server holding bucket φ(B j ) which of the |φ −1 φ(B j ) | Frobenius products from that bucket it seeks; thus, the upload cost aggregated across all servers (i.e., |Q|) is
where the max is due to the fact that the client must still send at least one bit to the server holding bucket φ(B j ), as a "signal",
Theorem 2.
A one-extra-word instance provides non-trivial communication (in the sense of Definition 3) provided the mapping φ satis es
where w ∈ Ω(lg|F|) is the bitlength of (the representation used to describe) each F element.
Proof. Since |R| = (s + 1)w < 2sw ∈ o |D| , it will su ce to show that |Q| ∈ o rws . Let
The size of a query q = (q 1 , . . . , q s+1 ) involving the servers holding buckets Eq(i;
The condition on max A ∈M (r,s) lg|φ −1 φ(A) | given by Theorem 2 is su cient but far from necessary to obtain nontriviality. A necessary condition would require only that the function F (A) mapping each choice of A ∈ M (r,s) to the upload cost conditioned on that choice satis es Exp F (A) ∈ o |D| . However, the simpler (and stricter) condition in Theorem 2 immediately yields the following corollary. Note that Corollary 1 implies that a one-extra-word instance provides non-trivial communication under the (perfectly reasonable, yet much stronger) assumption that the storage capacity of each server is polynomially bounded in |D|.
Computation cost analysis: The (online) computation cost for each server is e ectively nil. The computation cost for the client consists of the cost of setting up the system of equations-which is s subtractions in F-plus the cost of solving that system-which is at most an additional O s 2+ϵ eld operations, for some ϵ ≥ 0. In the special case where ν ⃗ = ⃗ 0, the latter step is "free" and the total client-side computation cost is just s subtractions in F. (When F is a binary eld, as in the one-extra-bit construction and our own bit-more-than-abit constructions, each of the s subtractions becomes a bitwise exclusive-OR.)
Security analysis: Privacy of a one-extra-word instance depends on the choice of φ. Note that each server holds one and only one bucket; for convenience, we equate each server with the bucket it holds. The next theorem gives necessary and su cient conditions for the interaction to provide perfect privacy against singleton coalitions (i.e., against individual servers). 
Intuitively, Theorem 3 says that a one-extra-word instance is private (with respect to singleton coalitions) provided φ never maps two distinct matrices from the same equivalence class (under any of the ≡ i ) to the same bucket. We note that this condition is trivially satis ed when φ is a bijection; in the sequel, we describe some other choices for φ that also satisfy the condition set forth in Theorem 3.
The proof of Theorem 3 uses Lemma 1, whose own proof follows easily from Part (i) of Observation 1. Before stating and proving the lemma, it will be helpful to brie y recall the relevant portions of the process by which the client requests a block D ⃗ i : the client selects a matrix A uniformly at random from M (r,s) , and then it retrieves D * , B j F for each B j ∈ Eq(i; A). Proof. Fix B ∈ M (r,s) and i ∈ [1.
.r ], and let X be the (uniform) random variable describing the client's initial selection of A ∈ M (r,s) . We need to prove that Pr B ∈ Eq(i; X ) = 1/(s + 1) r −1 .
From the Law of Total Probabilities, we have
which, since Eq(i; A) = Eq(i; B ) i B ∈ Eq(i; A), equals
Now, X is a uniform random variable on a sample space of size (s + 1) r and we know, from Part (i) of Observation 1, that |Eq(i; B )| = s + 1; hence, it follows that X takes on one of the s + 1 values in Eq(i; B ) with probability
We emphasize that the probability in Lemma 1 depends neither on the particular choice of B ∈ M (r,s) nor on i ∈ [1. .r ].
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3, which follows from Lemma 1 and Observation 1. By Lemma 1, for any given i ∈ [1.
.r ] and B ∈ φ −1 (j), we have Pr B ∈ Q {j} |︁ |︁ I = i = 1/(s + 1) r −1 ; thus, it will su ce to show that |Q {j} (A)| ≤ 1. But this follows contrapositively from the condition |φ Eq(i; A) | = s + 1, since |Q {j} | ≥ 2 would imply the existence of B , B ∈ Eq(i; X ) with B ≠ B and φ(B ) = φ(B ) so that |φ Eq(i; X ) | < |Eq(i; X )| = s + 1.
"Only if": The "only if" direction follows from Part (ii) of Observation 1. Suppose there is an A ∈ M (r,s) with |φ Eq(i; A) | < s + 1. Then, by the Pigeonhole Principle, there must be a pair of distinct matrices B , B ∈ Eq(i; A) such that φ(B ) = φ(B ); so, set j = φ(B ) and let q * ≔ Q {j} (A)
be the query string for server j arising when the client selects A in a query for D ⃗ i . By Part (ii) of Observation 1, we know that B ∉ Eq(i * ; B ) for any i * ≠ i; hence, we have
which proves that the construction is not perfectly {j}-private.
Taken together, Theorems 1-3 imply that, given a suitable vector ν ⃗ and mapping φ, the one-extra-word construction yields a perfectly 1-private PIR protocol. Moreover, as noted previously, setting F = GF(2) yields a protocol having the lowest download cost possible. The next section discusses possible choices for φ.
4 "Bit-more-than-a-bit" protocols
We now describe our new "bit-more-than-a-bit" construction, a family of perfectly 1-private one-extra-word protocols parametrized by the number of buckets ≥ 2 and the number of words per block s. (Recall that the number of buckets equals the number of servers.) Each member of the bit-more-than-abit family uses a binary eld F = GF(2 w ) where w = b s , the all-0s vector ν ⃗ = ⃗ 0, and the mapping φ :
de ned in Equation (1) below.
The "bit-more-than-a-bit" mapping: The new mapping is much simpler than the one-extra-bit mapping described in Appendix B. It represents each matrix A ∈ M (r,s) as an r -digit integer expressed in radix (s + 1) using a "natural" bijection, and then it assigns each integer to a bucket according to its congruence class modulo . The mapping is given by
where
This mapping induces buckets, compared with (s + 1)
r −1 buckets for the one-extra-bit mapping (cf. Equation (2));
hence, relative to the one-extra-bit construction, it reduces the number of servers required from (b + 1) r −1 -which is superexponential in |D| -to an arbitrary constant ≥ 2.
A consequence of this super-exponential reduction in the number of buckets is that each bucket now contains about (s + 1) r / distinct w-bit Frobenius products. Speci cally, the buckets now have a size that grows (at least formally) exponentially with the number of blocks comprising D. Fortunately, because each Frobenius product is easily computed as a sum of just r -many words from GF(2 w ), it su ces for the servers to store a copy of D and then construct needed Frobenius products on the y. We discuss this idea further in Section 4.1.
Communication cost analysis (or "choosing a eld size"): As each bit-more-than-a-bit instance is just a special instance of the one-extra-word construction, the analysis in Section 3 implies that the download cost (i.e., |R|) to fetch a b-bit block is just (s +1)w ≈ (b +w) bits. This suggests that setting w to be very small-for example, setting w = 1, as in the one-extra-bit construction-gives an ideal download cost.
Yet small constants like w = 1 lead to enormous bucket sizes and, thereby, fail to yield protocols that are non-trivial (in the sense of Definition 3). Indeed, to query for block i, the client must uniquely reference a speci c Frobenius product from among the ≈ (s + 1) r / such products held by each of the s + 1 buckets in an i-equivalence class. To reference the Frobenius product D * , A F , the client uses an ordered pair (x, j) in which x = a and j = a mod respectively denote the quotient and remainder obtained upon dividing
for any choice of
A ∈ M (r,s) , the client sends (r − 1) lg (s + 1) bits to each of the s + 1 servers in φ Eq(i; A) . This gives an upload cost aggregated across all servers (i.e., |Q|) of (s +1)(r −1) lg (s + 1) bits. Notably, if w = 1, then this is (b +1)(r −1) lg (b + 1) ∈ ω |D| and the construction fails to provide non-trivial communication. To yield a non-trivial protocol it is therefore necessary to set w somewhat larger (thereby incurring higher download overhead). The next theorem characterizes the choices of w (and, consequently, s) that yield protocols providing nontrivial communication. In light of Theorem 4, we suggest choosing a desired (say, small constant) number of words per block s ∈ N and then selecting the eld to be GF(2 w ) for w ≔ b s . The next observation follows by inspection.
Observation 3. Let and s be positive integers such that ≥ 2 and s < min( , b + 1). A bit-more-than-a-bit instance with buckets and s words per b-bit block has upload and download costs of (s + 1)(r − 1) lg (s + 1) and (s + 1)w ≈ s+1 s b bits, respectively.
Notice that setting s = 1 yields a 2× download overhead (ignoring ceilings) with an upload cost linear in r -indeed, one can e ectively view a protocol instance with s = 1 as a 2-server instance of the seminal PIR protocol for blocks due to Chor et al. [10, §6] . Increasing s decreases the download overhead geometrically while only increasing the upload cost arithmetically (ignoring the logarithmic term).
Computation cost analysis:
As each Frobenius product is precomputed during the setup phase, the (online) computation cost for each server remains e ectively nil. The clientside computation cost is s additions in GF(2 w ), which equates to about b bit operations-one exclusive-OR for each bit in the requested block.
Security analysis: We establish su cient conditions for the perfect 1-privacy of our bit-more-than-a-bit constructions in Theorem 5 below, which is an easy corollary to Theorem 3 and the following lemma. Theorem 6. Let s and be positive integers such that s < and gcd(s + 1, ) = 1. A bit-more-than-a-bit instance with buckets and s words per block is a perfectly 1-private -server PIR protocol. Moreover, the protocol has download rate s+1 s + o(1).
We note that, in contrast to the one-extra-bit construction, our bit-more-than-a-bit constructions maintain perfect privacy in the face of "tra c analysis" attacks (cf. Appendix C). Indeed, if we let X denote the random variable describing which of the servers receive no message in a given query, then for all
The latter probability is a consequence of (i) the one-to-one correspondence between queries for block i and equivalence classes under ≡ i , and (ii) the fact that server j holds exactly one element from each of |φ −1 (j)| out of (s +1)
r −1 such equivalence classes.
Virtual buckets
Recall that each bucket in a bit-more-than-a-bit instance having s words per block contains about (s + 1) r / distinct w-bit
Frobenius products, a quantity that scales exponentially with the number of blocks in D. Fortunately, because each Frobenius product is easily computed as a sum of just r -many words from GF(2 w )-i.e., one word from each row of D * -it su ces for a server to store a copy of D and then construct needed Frobenius products on the y. In fact, having all servers store D eliminates the need to associate each server with a xed bucket, thereby eliminating the requirement from Theorems 5 and 6 that gcd(s + 1, ) = 1. Indeed, with this approach, we are free to set = s + 1 so that the client simply involves all servers in all queries. For this reason, we say that a server who stores all of D and computes arbitrary Frobenius products on the y holds a virtual bucket of D.
Virtual buckets x the per-server storage cost as |D| bits, while increasing the online computation cost to at most r additions in GF(2 w ), each of which is implemented as a bitwise exclusive-OR of w-bit binary strings. However, on average a fraction 1/(s + 1) of the rows of A contain e ⃗ s+1 , which, because we set ν ⃗ = ⃗ 0, induces a no-op; hence, the expected computation cost per server is closer to r s 
Computational 1-privacy
This section presents our most e cient construction, a computationally 1-private variant of the bit-more-than-a-bit family of PIR protocols with virtual buckets. The simplest form of this computationally 1-private construction, which can be instantiated with = 2 L servers for any positive integer L, reduces the per-server upload cost from rL bits in the perfectly 1-private bit-more-than-a-bit construction to just (λ + 2) lg r λ L bits, where λ is a security parameter (say, λ = 128 or 256). The download cost remains unchanged and the computation cost increases only modestly in practice (assuming both clients and servers are equipped with modern CPUs that support the AES-NI instruction set).
The computationally 1-private construction replaces the uniform random query strings from our perfectly 1-private construction with pseudorandom query strings generated by an L-tuple of 2-out-of-2 distributed point functions [17] , each mapping integers from [1.
.r ] to 1-bit outputs. A point function in this context refers to a function p i : [1. .r ] → {0, 1} such that p i (i * ) = 1 if i * = i, and 0 otherwise; while one can think of a distributed point function as an extremely compact, secret-shared representation of a point function.
We provide the following formal de nition for a 2-outof-2 distributed point function with 1-bit outputs, which we adapt from De nition 2.2 of Boyle, Gilboa, and Ishai [8, §2] 
(ii) (Computational) secrecy: There exists a PPT algorithm Sim such that the distribution ensembles
are computationally indistinguishable.
The following (rather trivial) lemma will be convenient for proving that our DPF-based query construction provides computational 1-privacy (à la Definition 5), which is an indistinguishability-based (rather than simulation-based) notion of privacy.
.r ] and for all b ∈ {0, 1}, the distribution ensembles
Proof (sketch). This follows immediately from the de nition of computational secrecy for a (2, 2)-DPF (Part (ii) of Definition 7) and the triangle inequality.
Our construction uses the e cient (2, 2)-DPF construction of Boyle, Gilboa, and Ishai [8, Figure 1 ] with 1-bit outputs. The computational secrecy of that construction relies only on the existence of a xed-expansion pseudorandom generator G : {0,1} λ → {0,1} 2λ+2 ; a computationally e cient candidate for such a PRG is easily constructed from any block cipher. A typical choice for concrete instantiations is to use 128-or 256-bit AES (hence our reliance on CPUs with the AES-NI instruction set for e ciency in practice). The e ciency of our construction also bene ts from the fast full-domain evaluation algorithm of Boyle et al. [8, §3.2.1], which expands a (2, 2)-DPF key k into the length-r bit vector
using just r /λ PRG evaluations [7, Theorem 3.3] . Fig. 1. (2, 2) -DPF key distribution and query expansion procedure for = 2 2 servers.
We also introduce the ' ' operator to denote the component-wise concatenation of length-r vectors over {0,1} * ; in particular, if ⃗ u = u 0 , . . . , u n and ⃗ ν = ν 0 , . . . , ν n , then
where ν i u i denotes concatenation of u i and ν i .
DPF-based computational 1-privacy
We are now ready to describe our computationally 1-private query construction. As previously explained, the objective of the construction is to leverage (2, 2)-DPFs to provide extremely compact representations of the client's query strings in an otherwise standard bit-more-than-a-bit instantiation.
The main technical challenge to overcome is the impedance mismatch between the "1-out-of-2" secrecy of the (2, 2)-DPFs and the desired "1-out-of-" privacy of the PIR queries. We resolve this by using an L-tuple of (2, 2)-DPF key pairs (all realizing the same underlying point function), which the client samples independently and distributes to the servers using a strategy reminiscent of Beimel and Stahl's generic transformation for 2-out-of-"robust" PIR from any 2-server PIR protocol [5, §3.1]. We rst examine the simplest and most efcient case in which = 2 L for some L ≥ 1; an extension to the case of arbitrary follows in Section 5.3.
Power-of-2 number of servers
Query construction (aka "DPF key distribution"): The DPFbased query construction for = 2 L servers works as follows.
Assign to each of the servers a numeric label j between 0 and − 1 and then, for each j ∈ [0 . . − 1], consider the L-bit binary representation (j L−1 · · · j 1 j 0 ) 2 of j, where j e denotes the e th-least-signi cant bit of j. To query for block D ⃗ i , the client samples L independent (2, 2)-DPF key pairs for the point func-
and then, to each server j ∈ [0 . . − 1], it sends the query string
where, as above, j e is the e th-least-signi cant bit of j.
Because each server receives either the 0th or 1th key from each DPF key pair, and because which key a given server receives is determined by the corresponding bit in its label, it follows that (i) no server receives both keys from a single DPF key pair, and (ii) no two servers receive the same sequence of DPF keys.
Query expansion: Upon receiving the query string q j from the client, server j parses it as a sequence of DPF keys
and then it performs a full-domain evaluation on each of the keys and concatenates the resulting bit vectors componentwise to obtain a length-r vector of L-bit integers; that is, it computesq
From here, the server proceeds exactly as it would upon receiving the query stringq j directly from the client in a perfectly 1-private bit-more-than-a-bit instance with virtual buckets. Figure 1 illustrates the DPF key distribution and query expansion procedure for a protocol instance involving = 2 2 servers. In that gure, the ordered pairs (k (1) 0 , k 1 ) are both (2, 2)-DPF key pairs sampled independently using Gen(1 λ ; i).
Correctness analysis:
We now analyze the correctness of the computationally 1-private bit-more-than-a-bit construction. In particular, Theorem 7 establishes that the vectors q 0 , . . . ,q −1 produced by the servers indeed correspond to an i-equivalence class of M (r,s) where s = − 1.
an L-fold sequence of (2, 2)-DPF key pairs for a point function
di er in column i * if and only if i * = i.
Proof. We prove the "if" and "only if" directions separately.
"If": Let e be a bit position at which w e ≠ x e . From the correctness criterion for a (2, 2)-DPF, we have Eval(k
x e , i) and it follows that the i th components of ⃗ w and ⃗ x di er in at least one bit.
"Only if": Suppose that ⃗ w and ⃗ x di er in column i * and let
be the position of a bit at which they di er; i.e., let e be such that Eval(k
x e , i * ) = 1. Then, from the correctness criterion of a (2, 2)-DPF, p i (i * ) = 1 so
The preceding theorem together with a simple counting argument yields the following corollary.
is an L-fold sequence of (2, 2)-DPF key pairs for a point function
The next theorem is an immediate consequence of Corollary 2 and the "only if" direction of Theorem 7.
Theorem 8. If (Gen, Eval) is a (2, 2)-DPF for P(r ) providing (perfect) correctness (in the sense of Part (i) of Definition 7), then the 2 L -server DPF-based bit-more-than-a-bit construction provides (perfect) correctness (in the sense of Definition 2).
Communication cost analysis:
The download cost of a DPFbased bit-more-than-a-bit protocol instance is identical to that of a perfectly 1-private instance with the same number of virtual buckets. In terms of upload cost, the client in a DPFbased bit-more-than-a-bit instance sends L distinct DPF keys to each server. Assuming that the DPFs are implemented with the optimized (2, 2)-DPF construction of Boyle, Gilboa, and Ishai [8, Figure 1 ] with 1-bit outputs, the total upload cost is then L(λ + 2)( lg Computation cost analysis: The DPF-based bit-more-than-abit construction imposes some (modest) computation overhead relative to a perfectly 1-private bit-more-than-a-bit instance. The overhead consists of (i) the cost for the client to sample the DPF key pairs, and (ii) the cost for each server to expand its DPF keys using a full-domain evaluation (plus nominal costs associated with component-wise concatenation). Sampling the DPF key pairs is an extremely lightweight operation: each sample takes about 2 lg In Section 6, we present experimental evidence from our prototype implementation. Our ndings suggest that, for plausible parameter settings, the computation overhead associated with sampling DPF key pairs and query expansion are insigni cant relative to the time required to compute the Frobenius products speci ed by the expanded query vectors. In fact, the DPF-associated computation times are low enough that we can reasonably surmise that reductions in upload time will vastly overshadow them for all but the most contrived of network settings and parameter choices.
Security analysis: A trivial reduction proves the computational 1-privacy of a DPF-based bit-more-than-a-bit construction follows from the perfect 1-privacy of regular bit-morethan-a-bit and the computational secrecy (Part (ii) of Definition 7) of the DPFs. In particular, given blackbox oracle access to a PPT algorithm A distinguishing between the distribution ensembles {Q {j} | I = i} and {Q {j} | I = i * } with advantage µ(λ), we obtain a PPT algorithm B distinguishing between the distribution ensembles {k
with the same advantage (cf. Definition 5 and Lemma 3). The reduction B works by (i) sampling L DPF keys from its distribution, (ii) concatenating the L samples to form q j , (iii) passing q j to A, and then (iv) returning whatever A returns. This reduction and Theorems 8 and 9 proves the following.
Theorem 10. If (Gen, Eval) is a (2, 2)-DPF for P(r ) providing computational secrecy (in the sense of Part (ii) of Definition 7), then a 2 L -server DPF-based bit-more-than-a-bit instance is a computationally 1-private 2 L -server PIR protocol.
Arbitrary number of servers
We now describe how to extend the computationally 1-private bit-more-than-a-bit protocol to an arbitrary number of servers, at the expense of some additional upload and computation overhead. The challenge to overcome is the existence of so-called modulo bias introduced when reducing integers dis-
Query construction (aka "DPF key distribution"): Let poly : N → N be some positive integer-valued polynomial. The basic idea behind the extension is quite simple: Set L = lg + poly(λ) and, as before, have the client sample an Lfold sequence of DPF key pairs and then send a query string q j comprising one DPF key from each key pair to each server j ∈ [0 . . − 1]. Note that although there are just servers, there are more than + 2 poly(λ) possible combinations of DPF keys from which the client may choose. The client chooses which sequences of DPF keys to send to each server uniformly, subject to the values in column i of the resulting vectors being pairwise incongruent modulo . The additional poly(λ) DPF keys serve to "smooth out" the distribution, reducing the magnitude of the modulo bias to a negligible level; thus, we refer to poly(λ) as the smoothing parameter. We stress that the smoothing parameter need not be large: Formally proving computational privacy requires only that poly(λ) ∈ Ω(λ ϵ )
for some ϵ > 0; in practice it is su cient to regard poly(λ) as a small(ish) constant, say poly(λ) = 64 or 80.
Query expansion: Upon receiving the query string q j from the client, server j parses it as a sequence of DPF keys and then performs L full-domain evaluations and an L-ary componentwise concatenation to obtain a length-r vector of L-bit strings (which it regards as integers). From here, server j reduces the vector component-wise modulo to obtain the desired lengthr vector of integers in [0 . .
Correctness analysis: The "if" direction of Theorem 7 guarantees that the servers generate vectors of L-bit integers containing identical values in all but the i th column; thus, after reduction modulo the vectors remain identical in all but (perhaps) the i th column. Furthermore, because the client selects DPF keys so as to ensure that the entries in column i at the servers are pairwise incongruent modulo , the values in 6 This is always possible as (i) Corollary 2 ensures the 2 L possible sequences of DPF keys collectively span [0 . .
column i remain pairwise distinct after reduction modulo . This proves the following theorem.
Theorem 11. If (Gen, Eval) is a (2, 2)-DPF for P(r ) providing (perfect) correctness (in the sense of Part (i) of Definition 7), then the -server DPF-based bit-more-than-a-bit construction provides (perfect) correctness (in the sense of Definition 2).
Communication and computation cost analysis: Relative to the 2 L -server construction, the construction for arbitrary increases upload cost and computation cost associated with sampling DPF key pairs and performing full-domain evaluations each by a factor of approximately + poly(λ) / ; the download cost is una ected. Additionally, each server must perform a component-wise reduction modulo , although in implementations it is possible to interleave this operation with the component-wise concatenation so that it introduces essentially no overhead (at most one conditional subtraction) per DPF key.
Theorem 12. The -server DPF-based bit-more-than-a-bit construction provides non-trivial communication (in the sense of Definition 3).
Security analysis: In terms of privacy, the -server construction is nearly identical to the 2 L -server construction, with one notable exception: the expanded query vectors in the -server construction exhibit a (small) statistical bias. Speci cally, writing 2 L = Q · +R with 0 ≤ R < using the Division Algorithm,
; thus, the probability mass function describing each component of an expanded query vector assigns a probability of
i, where the distribution is uniform (since clients choose the DPF key sequences uniformly). Fortunately, as the smoothing parameter poly(λ) guarantees that the statistical distance between these two distributions is bounded above by 2 −poly(λ) ,
we still obtain following theorem.
Theorem 13. If (Gen, Eval) is a (2, 2)-DPF for P(r ) providing computational secrecy (in the sense of Definition 7) and if poly(λ) ∈ Ω(λ ϵ ) for some ϵ > 0, then the -server DPFbased bit-more-than-a-bit construction provides computational 1-privacy (in the sense of Definition 4).
6 Implementation & evaluation source C ++ library called libbitmore [23] , which we built atop our own dpf ++ library [22] . To facilitate a fair head-to-head comparison with the "folklore optimal" protocols, our codebase also incorporates hand-optimized implementations of both the 2-server variant of Chor et al.'s protocol [10] and the basic 2-server DPF-based protocol incorporating all optimizations suggested by Boyle et al. [7] . 7 We also compare our implementation with Percy ++ v1.0 [19] and RAID-PIR v0.9.5 [13] , a pair of open-source multiserver PIR libraries that are widely used as benchmarks in the PIR research community.
The remainder of this section presents selected ndings from a pool of experiments designed to measure the performance implications of various parameter choices and resulting speedups relative to prior work. We conducted all experiments on a workstation running Ubuntu 18.04.2 LTS on an AMD Ryzen 7 2700x eight-core CPU @ 4.30 GHz with 16 GiB of RAM and a 1 TB NVMe M.2 SSD. (We had this workstation custom-built for CA$1050 in April 2019.) All experiments measured the running times for a single client or server instance running in isolation on a single CPU core. We repeated all experiments for 100 trials and report herein the sample mean (wall-clock) timings across all trials. With the exception of RAID-PIR, all experiments exhibited sample standard deviations that were small relative to the sample means; thus, we omit error bars in our plots to reduce clutter and improve visual clarity. When discussing selected statistics in the text, we write M ± s to indicate a sample mean of M and sample standard deviation of s. We report all such statistics to one digit of precision in the sample standard deviation.
7 Although the new constructions include the latter two protocols as special cases, our standalone implementations are slightly faster than xing = 2 in our implementation of the general constructions.
DPF key sampling and expansion
Our rst set of experiments measures the time required for DPF key sampling (by the client) and expansion (by the server) for various numbers of servers ( ) and database heights (r ) in our computationally 1-private protocols. We provide log-log plots of our ndings in Figure 2 . We emphasize that the costs for DPF key sampling and expansion do not depend on the bitlength (b) of the database blocks. As expected, the costs for both operations are consistently low, even for databases with relatively large numbers (i.e., hundreds of millions) of blocks-notice that the -axis on both plots measures wall-clock time in microseconds. DPF key sampling: For = 2 L , the running times reported in our DPF key sampling plot (Figure 2a ) consist only of sampling L independent (2, 2)-DPF key pairs. For not a power of 2, they also include the time required for (i) the sampling of pol (λ) = 80 extra DPF key pairs for smoothing and (ii) the uniform random selection of key sequences to satisfy the requisite pairwise-incongruence property (see Section 5.3); consequently, the running times for these experiments are an order of magnitude higher than for = 2 L . Nonetheless, all experiments complete in under 100 microseconds.
DPF key expansion:
The DPF key expansion plot (Figure 2b) reports the time required for both the full-domain evaluation of each DPF key and the subsequent componentwise concatenation (including modular reductions).
We implement the component-wise concatenation using our own algorithms based on 256-bit vectorized (AVX2) instructions. For = 2 L , our algorithm iterates over the bits obtained via full-domain evaluation of each DPF key in 32-bit increments, using AVX2 intrinsics to expand each 32-bit segment into a 32-byte vector type. It then uses simple (vectorized) masking and bitwise logical ORs to e ectively concatenate 32 components in parallel. This yields an order-ofmagnitude speedup versus an "obvious" implementation of component-wise concatenation, helping to ensure that DPF key expansion contributes insigni cantly to the servers' total computation time; however, it also limits our implementation to at most L = 8 keys per server, thus imposing a limit of = 256 on the total number of servers. Our algorithm for not a power of 2 is similar, except it periodically performs (parallel) partial modulo-reductions and uses lookup tables to simulate expanding each bit in the full-domain evaluations beyond the architecture-imposed 1-byte boundary. This approach signi cantly reduces the overhead from modular reductions, though it imposes an even stricter limit of = 127 on the number of servers (to avoid over owing bytes between partial reductions).
As expected, the costs for DPF key expansion (Figure 2b ) are signi cantly higher than for sampling ( Figure 2a) ; indeed, the cost for DPF key expansion scales with r , whereas DPF key sampling scales with lg r . Nonetheless, all experiments with = 2 L complete in under 1 second and all experiments
with not a power of 2 still complete within about 1 minute. Focusing on a "modestly" sized database with just r = 2 20 rows, we nd that all experiments for = 2 L complete within just over half a millisecond and all experiments with not a power of 2 complete in well under 50 milliseconds.8 Looking ahead to Figure 3 , we observe (perhaps surprisingly) that in all cases DPF key expansion ends up being (slightly) faster than sampling a pseudorandom query of the same length using arc4random; thus, in addition to signi cantly reducing upload costs (e.g., from 0. 8 Astute readers may notice that, although the cases of = 3, 7, and 15 respectively expand and concatenate 82, 83, and 84 DPF keys, the di erences in their throughputs are nontrivial (ranging from 22.192 ± 0.006M rows/s for = 3 to 15.78 ± 0.01M rows/s for = 15). This larger-than-expected di erence owes to the frequency with which our implementation must perform partial modular reductions to avoid over owing bytes, which is dependent on the bit length of the modulus.
Varying the "smoothing parameter": Note that the plots in Figure 2 all x the smoothing parameter as poly(λ) = 80. We also conducted a series of experiments to study the implications of varying poly(λ), from poly(λ) = 0 up to poly(λ) = 6λ (i.e., from poly(128) = 0 up to poly(128) = 768) for a xed number of servers ( = 3) and database height (r = 2 20 ).
We provide a log-linear plot of the results in Figure 3 . The results are unsurprising: increasing poly(λ) e ects a corresponding increase in DPF key sampling and expansion times, with key expansion times ranging from 0.470±0.006 ms when poly(λ) = 0 up to 1681 ± 3 ms when poly(λ) = 768. In a practical deployment, we recommend setting poly(λ) between 64 and 96 to strike a good balance between performance and security, which in these experiments yielded expansion times from 31.4 ± 0.1 ms up to 55.4 ± 0.2 ms. In terms of upload cost, setting poly(λ) = 0 yields queries of size 0.41 KiB, while poly(λ) = 80 yields queries of size 16.92 KiB and setting poly(λ) = 768 yields 158.85 KiB. Thus, even for "unreasonably" large values of the smoothing parameter, DPF sampling times, DPF expansion times, and perserver upload costs remain quite modest for a database having on the order of a few millions of blocks.
Computational vs. perfect privacy
Our second set of experiments compares the cost of (clientside) query generation for DPF-based computationally 1-private protocol instances versus perfectly 1-private protocol instances as the database height (r ) grows. We provide a loglog plot of our ndings in Figure 4 . For = 2 L , perfectly 1-private query generation is implemented using a single call to arc4random_buf, relying on the Linux kernel to provide the required number of pseudorandom bits as e ciently as it knows how. For not a power of 2, it is implemented using r consecutive calls to arc4random_uniform, which involves a modular reduction and the occasional re-sampling (to account for modulo bias) for each query component; thus, similar to the computationally 1-private protocol, we observe a notable performance penalty when not a power of 2. Fig. 4 . Wall-clock time for client-side query construction in both computationally and perfectly 1-private protocols. For computationally 1-private instances with not a power of 2, we set the smoothing parameter to poly(λ) = 80.
As expected, query generation times in the computationally 1-private protocols scale quite well (indeed, logarithmically) relative to query generation in the perfectly 1-private protocols. Indeed, as noted in Section 6.1, even the linear-cost DPF key expansion consistently outperforms query sampling (by a factor 2-3× for = 2 L and by 1.15-1.63× for not a power of 2). We conclude that, for any realistic parameter settings, our computationally 1-private protocol is strictly faster than its perfectly 1-private counterpart.
Response generation
Our third set of experiments compares the time required for each of = 2 L servers to respond to a query, for various choices of L and a xed number of blocks (r = 256), as the database width (b) grows. We measure here only the time required to respond to an "expanded" query; thus, we do not distinguish between perfectly and computationally 1-private protocols, which perform identically (indeed, run the same code on inputs from computationally indistinguishable distributions) for this step of the protocol. We emphasize that response generation is far and away the most computationally intensive step in all constructions we consider (notice that the -axis on Figure 5 is in milliseconds versus microseconds in all the other plots); indeed, response-generation speedups from increasing dwarf the comparatively tiny query costs in Figures 2-4 . When = 2 1 (i.e., in the "folklore" protocols), the servers process the database at a rate of 5.7 ± 0.5 GiB/s, whereas when = 2 6 this throughput increases to a whopping 144 ± 3 GiB/s-more than a 25× speedup! Transitioning from b = 2 24 to b = 2 26 bytes per block yields a database that exceeds our 16 GiB of physical memory, resulting in a steepening of each trendline. The trendlines gradually converge to a new slope-re ecting that the computation rate is now limited by disk-read throughput-with instances having fewer servers converging more quickly. The di ering convergence rates stem from our using posix_madvise to help the Linux kernel prefetch memory pages we will soon need-with = 2 6 servers, the (at most) 256 required words occupy about 8 GiB and still t in physical memory. The 25× speedup for = 2 6 versus = 2 1 servers is comparable to the increase in the total number of servers and, hence, in the total amount of parallelism introduced. This is not surprising, as the total (expected) number of bit operations done by all servers is independent of . It is worth noting, however, that one cannot simply match the throughput of our single-threaded = 2 6 computation by running 32 threads on each of = 2 1 servers, since the response-generation computation is I/O bound; rather, to match the speed of the = 2 6 protocol, one would need to divy up the work of each server among multiple compute nodes (à la MapReduce) and allow each "thread" to saturate its own memory bus. We hasten to add that, although this would roughly match the throughput of our new protocols with an equivalent hardware investment, the result would remain non-competitive in terms of communication and client-side reconstruction costs.
Client-side reconstruction: We also measured the time required for the client to reconstruct the responses. We provide log-log plots of our ndings in Figure 6 . As expected, the cost of reconstruction is essentially constant across all ex- 6.4 Head-to-head with Percy ++ Our fourth set of experiments compares the performance of libbitmore with that of Percy ++ v1.0 [19] , an open-source C++ implementation of various PIR protocols. Percy ++ supports numerous protocols with varying privacy thresholds [1, 10, 15, 18] , Byzantine robustness guarantees [15] , query batching [21, 24, 26] , τ -independence [16] , and more. Here we repeat a subset of our libbitmore experiments on a selection of "basic" protocols, xing the privacy threshold and number of servers in all Percy ++ experiments as t = 1 and = 2, respectively. These parameter choices provide the best possible performance for query generation and response reconstruction (whereas server-side computation and per-server communication cost are both agnostic to these settings [21] ).
The fastest protocol Percy ++ supports is the folkloreoptimal protocol of Chor et al. [11, 27] -by far the slowest protocol in libbitmore. Figure 7 shows that the implementation of that protocol in libbitmore is noticeably faster than the one in Percy ++ . We also plot running times for Goldberg's protocol [18] with arithmetic in GF(2 8 ), GF(2 16 ), and integers modulo 32-and 128-bit primes. We stress although libbitmore is much faster, many useful features in Percy ++ cannot be realized in its simpler setting.
Head-to-head with RAID-PIR
Our fth and nal set of experiments compares the performance of libbitmore with that of RAID-PIR v0.9.5 [13] . RAID-PIR is highly con gurable: -server instances can be congured with a tunable privacy level ranging from 1-privacy through to ( − 1)-privacy. Here we repeat a subset of our libbitmore experiments, xing the privacy threshold (which they refer to as the redundancy parameter [14] ) as t = 1 to yield instances with computational 1-privacy. Unlike with Percy ++ , a direct comparison between libbitmore and RAID-PIR is apt: in both cases, the cost of a (1-private) query decreases as the number of servers grows. We nd that, given equivalent parameter choices, libbitmore consistently outperforms RAID-PIR on every metric, with improvements ranging from modest (1.3× faster when = 2 2 and b = 4 MiB) to extreme (44 888.9× less upload when = 2 2 and r = 2 30 blocks). Fig. 8 . Head-to-head comparison with computationally 1-private RAID-PIR v0.9.5 instances for ranging from 2 1 to 2 32 . The scale of some experiments was limited because RAID-PIR v0.9.5 cannot handle databases that exceed physical memory.
C Necessary and su icient conditions for C-privacy
The privacy guarantees of a one-extra-word instance are completely determined by the choice of φ. Intuitively, for any coalition C, a one-extra-word instance is C-private if (i) it provides 1-privacy, and (ii) no two servers in C ever participate in the same query, regardless of which block the client is requesting nor the outcomes of any coin tosses the client makes. The next theorem formalizes this intuition.
Theorem 15. Let C ⊆ [1. . ] be a coalition. A one-extra-word instance is C-private if and only if, for each server j ∈ C, 1. the construction is {j}-private (cf. Theorem 3), and 2. for all A ∈ φ −1 (j) and i ∈ [1.
.r ], φ Eq(i; A) ∩ C = {j}.
Proof (sketch). Let n = j ∈C |φ −1 (j)|. The rst condition guarantees that no client can ever request two or more distinct Frobenius products from a single coalition member (as part of the same query), while the second condition extends the rst to ensure that no client will ever request two or more distinct Frobenius products from two or more di erent coalition members. It follows that there are precisely n + 1 possible "joint views" that can arise for coalition C in each query: namely, the client can request any one of the n Frobenius products that coalitions' members hold, or it can request nothing at all from any of the coalition members. By Lemma 1, the rst n events each happen with probability 1/(s + 1) r −1 , regardless of which block the client seeks.
Moreover, because these n +1 events are pairwise disjoint and mutually exhaustive, it follows that the remaining ("nothing requested") event occurs with probability 1 − n/(s + 1) r −1 . As all probabilities are independent of the block being fetched, this establishes what we set out to prove.
Theorem 15 and the remarks following Theorem 14 suggest that the privacy guarantees of the one-extra-bit construction may, in fact, be much stronger than Corollary 4 and Theorem 14 suggest; the reality, however, is rather nuanced.
Privacy of the "one-extra-bit" construction, revisited: We rst note that if A 1 , A 2 ∈ M (r,s) are distinct matrices such that A 1 ∈ Eq(i; A 2 ) for some i ∈ [1.
.r ], then the construction cannot be φ(A 1 ), φ(A 2 ) -private; indeed, letting I denote the random variable that describes the index of the block the client seeks, and letting F 1 and F 2 respectively denote the events that the client requests A 1 and A 2 as part of its query, it follows from Lemma 1 that Pr F 1 ∩ F 2 |︁ |︁ I = i = 1/(s + 1) r −1 , whereas it follows from Part (ii) of Observation 1 that Pr F 1 ∩ F 2 |︁ |︁ I ≠ i = 0. Hence, there exist many doubleton coalitions with respect to which privacy cannot be guaranteed. (Indeed, each j ∈ [1. . ] belongs to rs distinct doubleton coalitions C with respect to which the construction is not C-private.) Thus, Theorem 14 gives the strongest "threshold" notion of privacy one can hope for.
What's more, the one-extra-bit mapping φ, as de ned in Equation (2), results in a protocol with the peculiar property that simply knowing that any given pair of servers holding a pair of i-equivalent Frobenius products is (or is not) involved in a query (without necessarily knowing what query strings those servers receive) is su cient for a passive observer -such as the querier's Internet service provider-to compromise the querier's privacy! We are unaware of any other PIR protocol whose privacy falls to such tra c analysis attacks when the observer may be limited to seeing only encrypted query strings. This surprising and troubling property is due to the following observation and its corollary.
Observation 8. Let φ be as de ned in Equation (2) . If B 1 ∈ Eq(i; A 1 ) and B 2 ∈ Eq(i; A 2 ), then φ(A 1 ) = φ(A 2 ) if and only if φ(B 1 ) = φ(B 2 ).
Recalling that we de ned P A ∈ F (s+1)×(s+1) as the permutation matrix such that Row 1 (A ·P A ) = e ⃗ 1 , an equivalent formulation of Observation 8 is:
B ∈ Eq(i; A) i B · P B ∈ Eq(i; A · P A ).
That is, if some Frobenius product in bucket j 1 has an iequivalent partner in bucket j 2 , then (i) every Frobenius product in j 1 has an i-equivalent partner in j 2 , and (ii) no Frobenius product in j 1 has a i * -equivalent partner in j 2 for any i * ≠ i (see Part (ii) of Observation 1).
Corollary 5. Let I denote the random variable that describes the index of the block the client seeks, and let F 1 and F 2 denote the events that a client requests a Frobenius product from bucket j 1 and from j 2 , respectively. Then, we have that either (i) Pr Colloquially, Equation (5.1) says that knowing any pair of servers involved in a given query is su cient to uniquely determine the index of the block sought. Moreover, Equation (5.2) says that if B ∈ Eq(i; A), then knowing that φ(A) is involved in a query, while φ(B ) is not, is su cient to deduce that the request is not for block i.
